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The Strategic Allocation of Limited Resources 
•  An old question in game theory. 
–  Colonel Blotto Games 
•  Zero-sum, simultaneous-move games in which two players 
allocate resources across a known number of sites. 
•  Borel 1921, Tukey 1949, Blackett 1958, Shubik and Weber 
1981, Golman and Page 2006, Roberson 2006.  
–  All-pay auctions 
•  Kvasov 2006 
The Strategic Allocation of Limited Resources 
•  An old question in game theory. 
–  Colonel Blotto Games 
–  All-pay auctions 
•  Renewed Attention After the Attacks of 9/11 
–  Secretary Chertoff’s summary: 
 “Although we have substantial resources to provide 
security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, as 
a nation, we must make tough choices about how to 
invest finite human and financial capital to attain the 
optimal state of preparedness.” 
Game Theory vis-à-vis Decision Theory 
When considering an adversary’s possible courses of 
action… 
–  Decision theory postulates the probabilities (based on 
experience and evidence outside the decision model). 
–  Game theory tries to infer these probabilities 
 
•  Intent (probability of using attack mode x to strike 
target y) should come out of the analysis, not be 
assumed as an input to the analysis. 
Goal of the Paper 
•  Existing work generally takes the defender’s budget as 
given as in the classic Blotto game. 
•  Today’s paper lets the defender determine how much to it 
wants to spend as well as how to allocate the resources it 
does spend. 
•  Perhaps more interestingly, we can also think about the 
effects the defender’s spending has on the attacker’s 
effort. In principle, the defender can fully deter the attacker, 
i.e., induce it to exert zero effort in attacking the defender. 
Four Key Results 
1.  The optimal (equilibrium) allocation of the defender's 
resources minmaxes the attacker. 
2.  Decompose the gain from increased spending into the sum 
of a defensive effect, a deterrent effect, and a cost effect. 
3.  The defender's allocation and level-of-spending problems 
are separable. 
4.  Facing a more determined attacker has no effect on the 
way the defender and attacker allocate their spending and 
effort, but does lead to greater levels of spending 
Plan of the Talk 
I.  Describe the model with endogenous levels of 
defender spending and attacker effort. 
II.  Give key intuition in a setting with a fixed budget. 
III.  Sketch the analysis when the defender and attacker 
determine the levels of spending and effort. 
The General Model    
•  N sites 
•  The defender decides how much to spend on protecting site j, rj , with 
total spending given by R = Σ rj . 
•  After observing the defender’s allocation, the attacker decides how 
much effort ej  to invest in attacking site j  with total effort given by  E = Σ 
ej . 
•  The defender suffers a loss λj > 0 and the attacker gains γj > 0 if site j is 
destroyed. Both get zero if the site is not destroyed. 
•  Costs of allocating R and E , cD (R ) and cA (E ), are increasing and 
convex. 
•  The probability that j is destroyed if attacked, Vj (rj,ej ), is decreasing and 




•  The marginal effect of additional effort on the vulnerability of a 
site is independent of the level of effort already being exerted. 
 
To Make the Algebra Easier: 
•  All sites are identical: γ = γj, λ = λj, v (r ) = vj(r ) 
•  v (r ) = 1 – vr 
•   cD (R) = kD R 2 and cA (E) = kA E 2 / 2. 
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Optimal Allocation with Identical Sites 
 
•  The optimal allocation equates the attacker’s expected 
payoffs to striking the various sites. 
•  If, to simplify matters, all of the sites are identical, then 







Solving the Game: The Attacker’s Problem 
 
•  Given that the defender spends R, the attacker’s payoff is: 
•  The optimal level of effort is:  
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Solving the Game: The Defender’s Problem 
 
•  Given that the attacker exerts E* (R) in response to R, the 
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Determining the Optimal Level of Spending 
•  The optimal level of spending occurs where the marginal 
reduction in losses from spending more is zero: ∂L/∂R = 0.  
•  The marginal effect of increased spending can be 
decomposed into the sum of a defensive effect, a deterrent 
effect, and a cost effect. 
 
[ ] [ ]
*
*1 / ( )( )( )     1 /          
defensive effect of increasing deterrent effect of increasing cost effect of increasing 
DvR N dc RL E RE R vR N





= + − +
∂ ∂ ∂1 4 4 4 2 4 4 43 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 43 1 44 2 4 43
The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Allocations 
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Conclusion: Four Key Results 
•  The optimal (equilibrium) allocation of the defender's 
resources minmaxes the attacker. 
•  The marginal effect of increased spending can be 
decomposed into the sum of a defensive effect, a deterrent 
effect, and a cost effect. 
•  The defender's allocation and level-of-spending problems 
are separable. 
•  Facing a more determined attacker has no effect on the 
way the defender and attacker allocate their spending and 
effort, but does lead to greater levels of spending 
